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Abstract
Ghana’s 2012 presidential elections ended with the 
incumbent, John Mahama, winning, and Nana Akufo-
Addo, representing the main opposition party filing a 
motion at Ghana’s Supreme Court to challenge the result. 
The opposition was exercising the right of the constitution 
grants political candidates to file a petition in court to 
nullify elections if they suspected fraud. This electoral 
challenge was the first of its kind in Ghana involving 
presidential candidates, and the first the court televised 
live. Ghanaians followed the proceedings in their finite 
detail not only for the unfamiliar terms like ‘pink sheets’, 
‘over-voting’, and ‘contempt of court’ that were thrown 
around, but also for dreading the violence they feared 
would emanate from the final verdict. People had an 
irrational fear their country might plunge into civil conflict 
as many African countries had experienced following 
elections. The court challenge the opposition instituted 
was a mixed blessing for Ghanaians, as it proved that a 
candidate and a party discontented with an election result 
willing to use the due process of law to seek redress could 
do so unhindered. On the other hand, the novelty of the 
court challenge and doubt about the ability of Ghana’s 
law enforcement establishment quelling a spontaneous 
upheaval from the losing party, if one occurred, put the 
nation on edge. To the relief of Ghanaians, however, the 
court decision came and went without a whimper, leaving 
in its trail many teachable lessons for the country. This 
paper analyzes the unique ways Ghanaians explored to 
mitigate the full effect of the anarchy they feared and hope 
other African countries learn some lessons from them. 
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Ghanaians designed the 1992 Constitution to 
become the bedrock for the democratic change and 
governance they hoped to have after the Berlin Wall fell. 
This constitution, the fourth the country adopted since 
independence, held up well against the difficulties of 
politics for twenty years until the presidential election of 
2012 challenged its mettle. The 2012 presidential election 
became infamous for a court challenge  the candidate who 
garnered the second highest votes initiated. The plaintiffs 
were Nana Akuffo-Addo and the National People’s Party 
(NPP) and the defendants, John Mahama and the ruling 
National Democratic Congress (NDC), plus the Electoral 
Commission (EC). John Mahama was vice president to 
John Atta Mills, the former president, who passed away 
in July 2012. The leaders of the NPP insisted there was 
‘incontrovertible evidence’ of widespread irregularities 
that favored the president and affected the result of the 
poll. The losing presidential candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo 
and the NPP, challenging the election’s result in court 
tested the resilience Ghana’s constitution had to absorb 
the effect of a novel case that could potentially plunge the 
country into anarchy. Ghanaians faced a clear dilemma. 
Ghana’s constitution clearly spells out the prescription for 
resolving electoral disputes by requiring a “person who 
had a right to be nominated as a candidate at the election 
to file a petition at the High Court.” The court challenge, 
however, created unprecedented anxiety in people 
because it foreboded fomenting the worst form of partisan 
discontent the country had ever known if the Supreme 
Court were to overturn the result which one party had 
wholeheartedly accepted. The Supreme Court waiting until 
June 2013, six months after the elections, to hear the case 
that continued through late August, worsened the nation’s 
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unease. Throughout the eight months, partisan analysts 
wrote critical commentaries and traded accusations at 
each other over the media. The stakes  the electoral 
challenge raised were high, as suddenly, the prospect of 
a presidential recall seemed possible, if the court were 
to rule for the plaintiffs and reorder fresh elections. This 
paper provides the background to how Ghanaians, fearing 
violence would deal with their budding multipartite 
experiment a cruel hand, invoked the social and cultural 
windbreaks their society had built over several years to 
forestall such foreboding. Ghana’s presidential electoral 
challenge underscores the challenges many African 
countries face when their constitutions are called upon 
to face up to difficult events such as an executive power 
aggrandizement or even a military coup. Although Ghana 
came out unscathed from the court challenge with the 
newly-elected president continuing his term, Ghanaians, 
undoubtedly, want to avoid facing a similar experience 
in the future even if the constitution worked as intended 
for the first time. Unfortunately, no one can assuage the 
anxiety of a candidate who loses an election by launching 
a similar challenge in court. If ever there was a panacea, 
however, it points to all the institutions and organizations 
involved in elections working more diligently to sanitize 
them from fraud. 
INTRODUCTION
When conducted diligently, elections in Africa have 
served more than a transition to democracy. Multipar 
elections have become the impetus for liberalization 
and incentive for political actors to expand democratic 
values (Lindberg, 2006). In reality, African elections 
have projected two divergent trends. On the one hand, 
Revolutions have brought political competition including 
promoting more responsive governments, civil liberties, 
and social justice. On the other, they have precipitated 
party instability, political violence, autocracy, and 
corruption (Opalo, 2012; Lynch & Crawford, 2011). 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s hostile socioeconomic and 
historical conditions that have caused low levels of 
economic development and high levels of poverty and 
illiteracy have not been conducive to democracy thriving 
(Sandbrook, 1996). Some observers have wondered if 
African countries would be able to keep their democratic 
political institutions through credible elections and 
fully embrace the ideals of rule of law, accountability in 
government, and an independent judiciary (Lemarchand 
1992; Onwuekwe, 2006). Adejumobi (2000) criticized 
elections as a “fading shadow of democracy” because 
the infrastructure for managing them and their laws and 
procedures remain largely perverted. Saha’s (2011) study 
of democracy in Ethiopia and the Republic of Congo 
shows that when applied properly, legislative competition 
could help to reduce poverty. In Ethiopia, “virtuous 
legislative democracy” led to economic growth, but 
in the Republic of Congo, on the other hand, ‘vicious 
legislative competition’ stifled growth. Political parties’ 
strong need to keep power impels them to engage in 
behaviors that have been harmful to national stability such 
as voter intimidation, vote buying, and ballot fraud. 
Even in South Africa where observers believe elections 
conducted since 1994 have been free and fair, fraud has 
been rampant with multiple registrations, multiple voting, 
falsifying voting tallies, and impersonation. Power 
gravitating towards the presidency in every African 
country and the pervasive clientelism that structures 
the relations between the state and the citizenry have 
corrupted political parties to win the presidency at all 
cost (van de Walle, 2003). Not surprisingly, the disputes 
surrounding presidential elections have superseded all 
others within the context of multiparty politics.
1.  ELECTION CONTENTIOUSNESS
It has become a familiar ritual for losing political parties 
to blame wining parties for rigging elections despite the 
negligible payoff such complaints have yielded. However, 
the charge of vote rigging by opposition groups against 
ruling governments throughout Africa must have merit 
because some incumbent candidates have garnered 
ridiculously high victory margins while hardly scraping 
by in others. National founders such as Nkrumah of 
Ghana, Kenyatta of Kenya, and Senghor of Senegal held 
uncompetitive elections and achieved their longevity by 
strangulating the opposition. Eyadema of Togo, Bongo 
of Gabon and Biya of the Cameroons who were part of 
the second generation of leaders, got better at managing 
political longevity by manipulating electoral results.1 From 
mid-1960 to late 1980 when African politics experienced 
extreme turbulence, incumbent governments felt uneasy 
whenever opposition groups complained about the state 
of governance. Such criticism often drew the military 
into politics. The coups d’état that destabilized countries 
became symptomatic of the distrust that festered between 
ruling governments and the military. Owusu (1986) showed 
how military coups in Ghana and other parts of Africa, 
which he labeled ‘ritualized rebellion,’ became a means of 
transferring power from one ruling elite (military, civilian, 
or both) to another. Popular revolutions in Ethiopia, Ghana, 
and Burkina Faso in the 1970s and 1980s showed how 
brought important structural changes to sharing power.
When a country relies almost only on human labor 
to conduct elections’ mundane tasks, it exponentially 
increases the error rate and the contentiousness associated 
1 In Togo, 1993, Eyadema won 96.42% to 1.90% his challenger, 
Jacques Amouzou, got. In 1998, Eyadema won 52.1% against 
Gilchrist Olympio’s 34.2%. In Cameroon, 1992, Biya won 39.98% 
against 35.97% of John FruNdi, his main challenger. In 1997, 
Biya won 92.57% to Henri Ndlend’s 2.50%. See African Elections 
Database.http://africanelections.tripod.com/cm.html
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with elections. The money African governments 
allocate for elections are usually paltry, largely because 
their overstretched budgets leave them little room to 
finance social service projects like water and roads. 
That circumstance has forced countries to embrace 
the technology of electronic voting, collecting voters’ 
data biometrically, and training computer specialists 
to coordinate and interpret electoral data slowly and 
reluctantly. Besides, decrepit and inadequate infrastructure 
in electricity, roads, bridges, and polling stations and 
rest rooms make the work of officials and observers 
charged with conducting elections difficult. After voters 
had cast their ballots under these difficult circumstances, 
the task of counting, collating and crosschecking the 
results with historical data becomes burdensome when 
the only method for making easy those tasks is human 
labor. Even in an advanced industrialized country, as the 
saga that defined the 2000 presidential elections between 
George Bush and Al Gore in Palm Beach County, Florida, 
showed, unavoidable errors occur when antiquated 
technology is used to help in casting and counting votes 
(Agresti & Presnell, 2002; Mebane, 2004).  
According to Jeffries (1998), limited acceptance of 
election results, justified or unjustified, underscores 
the zero-sum nature of politics in developing societies 
of Africa. Moehler (2009) has shown that the losers 
of elections in Africa are less inclined to trust their 
political institutions, government authority or feel 
that voting matters. Winners, on the other hand, are 
more submissive and grant unconditional support for 
their leaders. Violence, unsurprisingly, has become a 
common response political parties use to intimidate 
voters or show their displeasurewith electoral loss 
(Branch & Cheeseman, 2009; Straus, 2012). The 
mayhem that followed Kenya’s elections in 2007 and 
Zimbabwe’s in 2008, was triggered by the view among the 
electorate the elections had been rigged, and many people 
became the victims of violence regardless of ethnicity and 
wealth (Klopp & Kamungi, 2008; Dercon & Gutierez-
Romero, 2012). In 2013, Kenyans understandably were 
petrified about the violence of 2007 repeating when 
the losing candidate in the presidential elections, Raila 
Odinga, complained about fraud. The Waki Commission 
Report on Kenya’s electoral violence accused each of 
the major groups in the country for perpetrating violence 
to achieve political objectives. Members of the majority 
Kikuyu in particular perpetrated violence against smaller 
groups like the Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya community 
members (Waki Commission, 2009). In Côte d’Ivoire, 
the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo disputed the 
electoral results and resisted the political transition for 
four months through military action (Milam & Jones, 
2011). Once a country experiences a major electoral 
violence it leaves a lasting impression on people that 
causes uneasiness whenever candidates complain about 
electoral fraud. 
Using courts to mediate electoral disputes, especially 
presidential elections, has been a sparingly used strategy 
even though the handful of cases filed has increased their 
prominence. The autocratic governments that dominated 
Africa’s political landscape for three decades refused to 
hold regular elections, and when they did would not allow 
the losing candidate a free reign to challenge the result 
in court. One of the earliest court challenges, however, 
occurred in Uganda in 2006 when Kizza Besigye, the 
petitioner, brought a case against the respondents, Yoweri 
Museveni, the president, and the Electoral Commission, 
challenging the accuracy of the results of the February 
2006 presidential election. The petitioner contended the 
election was invalid because the Electoral Commission 
did not conduct it under the principles laid down in 
the Presidential Elections Act, and the noncompliance 
significantly affected the results. Even though the court 
ruled in favor of some of the charges Besigye laid out, it 
inferred the Electoral Commission failing to comply with 
the principles laid down in the constitution did not affect 
the results of the presidential elections2. The latest of such 
court challenges occurred in Zimbabwe in 2013, when 
Morgan Tsvangirai charged the Electoral Commission 
for rigging the July elections in favor of Robert 
Mugabe, the incumbent. Even though Tsvangirai 
and his MDC-T Party withdrew their legal challenge 
claiming he could not successfully bid his case after 
the High Court denied him timely access to election 
materials, the court considered the challenge anyway. 
Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, head of the 
Constitutional Court, dismissed the challenge saying 
the court found the elections had been free and fair 
(Zimbabwe Rejecting Fraud Claims,  2013). 
2.  THE COURT CASE
Ghana held parliamentary and presidential elections in 
December 2012, the sixth since the country renewed 
its experimentation in multiparty politics. According to 
Ghana’s Electoral Commission, John Mahama of the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) won 50.7% of the 
vote, and Nana Akuffo-Addo of the National Progressive 
Party (NPP), 47.7%. Mahama winning more than 50% 
of the vote cancelled the need for a round off. The 
Chief Justice swore in John Mahama as president on 7 
January 2013. Several candidates who lost the contest 
for parliamentary seats in 2012 filed motions in High 
Courts across the country to contest the results. The most 
prominent of these court challenges, however, was the 
opposition’s top presidential candidate filing a motion at 
2 Dr. Kizza Besigye v electoral commission, Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni. Election Petition No.1 of 2006, Judgment Date: 30 
January 2007. 
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Ghana’s Supreme Court to annul the incumbent president’s 
win. In filing the court motion, the NPP claimed it had 
waited until it had analyzed the data from over 26,000 
polling stations where voters cast close to 11 million 
votes. “To accept this result is to discredit democracy 
in Ghana and, in the process, distort the process of 
democratization in Africa. The New Patriotic Party, 
therefore, could not accept the results of the presidential 
election.” Besides the affidavits filed, the petitioners’ 
presented evidence in the form of color photocopies of 
pink sheets (Statement of Poll and Declaration of Results 
Form) from the polling stations where they were disputing 
the results as declared (Ghana Supreme Court, 2013). 
The petitioners based their case mainly on the figures 
on the pink sheets, the official document the Electoral 
Commission (EC) relied on to declare the results of 
the presidential poll (NPP Files 400,000 Documents, 
2013). The petitioners were asking the court to annul 
791,423 votes from 1,826 polling stations where ‘over-
voting’ was recorded to have happened. Accepting this 
dispute about over-voting would mean John Mahama, 
not getting the 50% +1 vote needed for an outright win. 
The petitioners tendered in a second amended petition on 
February 8, 2013 claiming the Ghanaian electorate did not 
validly elect John Dramani Mahama President. Rather, 
Nana Akuffo-Addo, the first petitioner, was elected and 
sought the courtto issue the proper consequential orders. 
The petitioners’ stated grounds in their second amended 
petition were ‘diverse and flagrant violations of the 
statutory rules governing the conduct of the presidential 
elections,’ and ‘gross and widespread irregularities in 
11,916 polling stations’ fundamentally impugned the 
validity of the results in those polling stations (Supreme 
Court, 2013, pp.3-4). The respondents, spearheaded 
by John Mahama, the Electoral Commission, and the 
ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), however, 
dismissed the allegations and asked the Court to throw it 
away. In mid-April, two months before the court began 
hearing the proceedings it backed covering the event live 
on television and radio. The Chief Justice reasoned, “the 
live telecast would help to ease the tension surrounding 
the taking of sides and acrimony that had characterized 
the petition challenging John Mahama’s presidency and 
erase any misconceptions held about the matter” (Supreme 
Court Endorses, 2013). 
3.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
On August 29, 2013, the Ghana Supreme Court issued its 
long-awaited verdict on the legal challenge the NPP and 
its presidential candidate had launched against the NDC 
and the incumbent president, John Mahama. The court’s 
duty, according to the petitioners, was to discover whether 
the statutory violations about omissions, irregularities 
and malpractices in the conduct of the elections affected 
the results of the elections (Supreme Court, 2013, p.53). 
In a lengthy 605-page summary, the court reaffirmed 
Mahama’s wins in a split 5-4 decisions filled with legal 
case history. The Supreme Court identified the core 
grounds of the petitioners’ claim as including: Over-
voting, voting without biometric proof, accepting votes 
in the absence of the signature of a presiding officer, 
duplicate serial numbers and duplicate polling station 
codes. The majority rebutted the petitioners’ claims item 
by item. The majority admitted the EC made mistakes 
entering ballot information such as in ballot accounting, 
rejected ballots, and tallying votes in ballot boxes. The 
petitioners, however, could not use faulty entries as 
proof of over-voting. A major basis for the petitioners’ 
complaint was to prove the pink sheets on whose basis the 
Electoral Commission declared the election results were 
flawed. In mid-June, a few days into the hearing, KPMG, 
an accounting firm, accepted to audit the pink sheets. On 
24 June, when KPMG tendered the pink sheets the court 
had given in evidence but the parties could not agree on 
the exact number of pinks sheets KPMG had taken in its 
possession (KPMG Finds 10,333 Pink Sheets, 2013). 
Another charge the petitioners laid was election 
officers not signing election results. The EC Chairman 
conceded that about 3% of election results records were 
unsigned because presiding agents were burdened with 
so many responsibilities on election day. The Chairman 
insisted, however, that officers failing to sign those pink 
sheets in no way affected the results of the elections. 
Finally, the court dismissed the petitioners’ charge 
of voting without biometric proof. Ghana’s Electoral 
Regulation makes it compulsory for the EC to provide 
every polling station with a biometric verification device 
to help establish by fingerprint the identity of the voter. 
(Supreme Court, p.222). The EC took this measure to 
reduce to the barest minimum impersonation and multiple 
voting. In their deposition, the petitioners argued the EC 
illegally considered voting in polling stations where voting 
took place without prior biometric proof when declaring 
the results of the presidential elections. The EC Chairman 
cryptically replied that no one without biometric proof 
voted, rather it was presiding officers who made entries in 
a column (column 3) of the pink sheets in error. The court, 
therefore, must not throw out votes that officers wrongly 
entered in column 3 because his duty was to safeguard 
the sanctity of every vote cast. The EC Chairman and the 
respondents argued the petitioners showed no evidence 
proving any incident of multiple voting at any polling 
station, and no one voted when he was not entitled to vote. 
4.  THE CHALLENGES OF 2008 AND 2012
Ghanaians embraced multiparty politics and adopted 
a new constitution in 1992, and it is remarkable that 
more than twenty years later the people have allowed 
the document to guide political discourse without 
making significant changes to the original document. 
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Ghanaians have kept a remarkable sense of decorum when 
conducting politics, which has helped the country to avoid 
the bouts of lawlessness that have dogged many countries 
that have embarked on a similar experiment in multiparty 
governance. Although Ghana’s politics has not been as 
incident-free as the country has projected it to the world to 
be, one characteristic about politics that explains why the 
country has avoided violent political outbursts has been 
the crosscutting support the major political parties have 
had from all the regions and the major ethnic groups (Heinz 
et al., 2010). MacLean (2004) reiterates this point by 
comparing Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, which though share 
identical ethnic, religious, and regional divisions have had 
different results in politics from grassroots associations. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, participation in ethnically diverse 
cocoa producer and mutual assistance organizations 
reinforces vertical patronage networks based on narrower 
ethnic identities. In Ghana, by contrast, participation in 
ethnically homogeneous local church groups encourages 
developing democratic values and practices locally that 
mediate the potential for ethnic conflict. In 2008, the 
image of political stability and tolerance Ghana had 
carefully constructed was put to a strenuous test during 
the close run-off elections between John Atta Mills of the 
NDC and Akuffo-Addo of the NPP. John Atta Mills won 
50.23 and Akuffo-Addo, 49.77 percent (Ghana Electoral 
Commission, 2008). The country held its breadth as it 
waited for the result of a single electoral district, Tain, 
out of over 200 districts, to decide who would win the 
run-off (Meissner, 2010). In July 2012, five months to 
the elections, John Atta Mills, the incumbent president, 
passed away unexpectedly forcing his party to renominate 
John Mahama, the vice-presidential candidate, to fill the 
vacancy. The opposition NPP saw a rare opportunity to 
wrestle power from the NDC. Candidates focused their 
campaign on economic issues, yet they also appealed to 
their base by playing the ethnicity card (Burke, 2013; 
Agyeman-Togobo, 2012). 
Chazan (1982)  draws a t tent ion  to  the  “dual 
phenomenon” in Ghana’s politics that simultaneously 
can intensify ethnic politicization or conversely bring 
mutability in ethnic participation. Ethnicity, she argues, 
is distinct from yet overlaps regional divisions.3 Nugent 
(2001), using ethnicity as an explanatory variable for 
Ghana’s 2000 elections asserts the idea did not assume a 
prominent profile during the campaign. There are genuine 
difficulties, he cautions, which come with discussing 
Ghanaian politics in ethnic terms because the language 
of identity politics is slippery and not consistent. Urban 
3 Ghana has had its presidents and heads of state selected from most 
of the country’s regions. Presidents in a chronological order and 
the regions in which they were born: Nkrumah (Western), Ankrah 
(Greater Accra), Busia (BrongAhafo); Acheampong (Ashanti); 
Akuffo (Eastern); Rawlings (Volta); Limann (Upper West); Rawlings 
(Volta); Kuffuor (Ashanti); Mills (Central); Mahama (Northern).
youth, Nugent believes, found ethnic politicking a 
distraction from the real issues of employment, access 
to education, and the space in which to live. Morrison 
and Hongh (2006) also recognize the dynamic and 
multilayered aspect of electoral participation in Ghana’s 
politics despite Ghanaians keeping a historical two-
party identity. Ethnic and regional cleavages show much 
more complex varieties of electoral support in the ten 
regions ranging from strong one-party to almost three 
party systems. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) see these 
cleavages as persistent and helping Ghana to achieve 
its virtual two-party characteristic, which has promoted 
democratic consolidation and removed the country’s 
previous turbulence. Wimmer et al. (2009) challenge 
the long-held assertion that highly diverse societies are 
more conflict prone; rather, they argue, armed rebellions 
are more likely to challenge states that exclude large 
portions of the population based on ethnic background. 
Since independence, Ghana, by happenstance, has had 
presidents who had served drawn across several ethnic 
groups and regions. 
Although Ghana’s economic and social life slowed 
down during the eight months the Supreme Court was 
considering the NPP’s court challenge, it would be 
shortsighted to blame the NPP for seeking redress in 
court. The NDC has suggested the NPP’s petition was 
a silly attempt to rewrite history, even as the NPP also 
has directly inferred the NDC manipulated the results of 
the presidential election. The NPP asserting widespread 
fraud in the presidential vote and going to court to 
defend that assertion have raised questions about how 
effective election monitors were ensuring transparency in 
the 2012 elections. Daxecker (2012) argues that election 
observers can mitigate violence by deterring electoral 
fraud, even though publicizing electoral manipulation 
may induce violent interactions between incumbents, 
opposition parties, and citizens. Kelley (2012) analyzing 
data from over 600 monitoring missions agrees with the 
assertion that outside actors often have no power and 
can even do harm. Election observers descended in large 
numbers for Ghana’s 2012 elections, the largest being 
the 250-member strong ECOWAS Election Observer 
Mission led by Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former 
president. The others were the Commonwealth Observer 
Mission, Canadian International Observer Mission 
and the African Union Election Observation Mission. 
Domestic observers included the Christian Council of 
Ghana (CCG) and the Coalition of Domestic Election 
Observers (CODEO). Even though these observers 
praised Ghana’s EC smoothly running the elections, 
they also issued separate reports criticizing the voting, 
especially using biometric registration that showed 
only a handful of political parties, intellectuals, and 
the public understood how it worked. An important 
characteristic mature democracies have which young 
democracies usually lack, is tolerance for other people 
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expressing contrary opinion, and people agreeing that 
political parties expressing different opinions on an issue 
must not cause violence. Ghanaians seemingly passed 
this tolerance test when no violence occurred in 2012 
after the elections and following the court ruling in 2013, 
despite each side in the dispute carelessly inviting trouble 
though acerbic language. 
The people of Ghana and the major political parties 
in the country may need continuous education about 
using decent language in political conversation. Another 
activity Ghanaians may have to streamline is the manner 
in which nonpolitical actors enter political discourse. The 
major parties can organize forums that allow pastors, 
Imams, chiefs, business leaders and former office 
holders to express their thoughts on contemporary issues. 
Moreover, reputable non-governmental organizations 
such as CHRAJ (The Commission on Human Rights 
and Administrative Justice), the Electoral Commission, 
and Danquah Institute can complement the effort toward 
debate by inviting these opinion leaders to discuss issues 
with the goal of diffusing tensions. Debating issues in the 
setting of a roundtable rather than on an obscure radio 
or television station, for instance, may mitigate the guest 
speakers using fighting words, a practice that became far 
too common as the Supreme Court deliberated the case. 
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution guarantees people the right of 
free speech and successive governments have not made 
serious attempts to take away that right. Never losing sight 
of this right, partisan spokespersons have taken it several 
steps further by interpreting free speech to mean the right 
to hurl diatribes at political opponents over the media to 
score points without expecting retribution in the form a 
lawsuit for defamation. In African politics, harsh rhetoric 
has become the vehicle which some leaders employ to 
incite violence as the violence in Rwanda in 1994 and 
Kenya in 2007 clearly showed. Before the 2012 election, 
the Christian Council of Ghana (2012) cognizant of the 
havoc violence could wreck on political stability, warned 
the top two political parties not to become too polarized 
as to make their supporters to believe they commanded 
the numbers to win the general election. This warning 
foreshadowed the litigation that followed the elections. 
The Chairperson of the National Peace Council, Reverend 
Asante, also warned, “Belonging to a political party 
doesn’t make us enemies,” and rebuked party supporters 
and political candidates for engaging in fighting talk 
involving character assassinations, harmful comments 
and ethnocentricism in a bid to court favor with voters 
(Agyeman-Togobo, 2013). 
5 .   A  N A T I O N  O N  E D G E :  A N 
ASSESSMENT
Ghana experienced an uncertain political history from 
1957 to 1992, as power alternated between civilians 
and the military. When Ghana held the first multiparty 
elections in 1992 after eleven years of military rule, 
however, the country began to redeem itself as one 
of the most stable multiparty democracies in Africa 
(Haynes, 1993; Lund, 2003). Since 1992 Ghana has 
successfully held quadrennial elections in 1996, 2000, 
2004 and 2008, a feat which the United States president 
rewarded by visiting the country in 2009. Elections in 
Ghana, however, have not been lacking in challenges, 
including fraud and occasional violence. Violence, 
comprising mainly of local skirmishes, has broken out 
among supporters of the top parties. One such skirmish, 
considered above the norm occurred in Bawku in the 
Upper East Region between Kusasis and Mamprusis in 
2000, although it was quickly contained (Smith, 2002). 
Besides, since Ghana’s democratic transition began, the 
NPP, the major opposition party, has challenged some 
election results. The party boycotted the parliamentary 
elections of 1992, after refusing to accept the legality 
of the presidential elections (Gadzekpo, 2001). In 1996, 
despite the European Union and the United States 
giving Ghana monetary aid to run the elections, the NPP 
raised questions about the elections’ integrity and to 
NDC’s win, even though the party did not seek redress 
in court. The 2012 presidential elections raised stakes 
so high the two leading parties could not ignore to 
consolidate power. The NDC hoped to entrench itself in 
spite of considerable odds, having had to select a new 
presidential candidate at short notice. The NPP, on the 
other hand, saw an opportunity to wrestle power from 
NDC’s disconcertion. 
Although most Ghanaians expected a court challenge 
following the elections because of the acrimoniousness 
of the campaign, they became anxious nevertheless about 
the effect a protracted court challenge would have on the 
country’s image and stability. The eight months separating 
filing the challenge and the Supreme Court’s ruling 
became the most harrowing period Ghanaians had ever 
experienced. No one, including the supporters of the two 
contending parties, could tell with certainty the manner 
in which rank-and-file members would react. Duodu 
(2013) described Ghana being “dazed” by the court 
case, because of the anxiety and tension it was creating. 
Despite the court challenge unsettling Ghanaians; it 
also raised questions about the extent to which Ghana’s 
democracy would be able to withstand the most ominous 
test it had yet to face. Nana Akufo-Addo and the NPP, 
doubtless, were exercising a basic constitutional right to 
seek recourse in a court of law to address an injustice. 
Doing so, however, made many Ghanaians to question 
the incalculable price of the country might have to pay 
for a case the Supreme Court could have dismissed for 
lacking merit. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
saw taking up the case an opportunity to show the people, 
and possibly the world that the rule of law reigned over 
Ghana’s politics. 
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Countries in Africa have become breeding grounds 
for electoral disputes, some of which degenerate slowly 
and uncontrollably into violence among groups. The 
upheaval that came to define the elections in Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and neighboring Côte d’Ivoire was not lost 
on Ghanaians, many of whom believed their country 
could be next. The court proceedings created its own 
suspense as the Supreme Court through deliberative 
decision making, sought to present itself as a neutral 
institution, cognizant but insulated from the vicious 
partisan bickering going on outside its walls. The court’s 
first move was taking six months after the elections to 
start hearing the proceedings. The court ostensibly used 
that period for preliminary hearings of the petitioners 
and respondents to evaluate the massive documentary 
evidence tendered. The second significant decision the 
court made happened in mid-April, when it decided to 
broadcast the proceedings live on radio and television. 
The Chief Justice reasoned, “the live telecast would 
help to ease the tension surrounding taking sides and ill 
will that had characterized the petition challenging John 
Mahama’s presidency and erase any misconceptions 
held about the matter” (Supreme Court Endorses, 2013). 
The court challenge was a novelty and coupled with 
broadcasting the proceedings live created unusually 
high interest among the public who became attentive 
and talkative. The court decided to curb this unregulated 
chatter, what the Chief Justice called “loose talk”, by 
censoring the speech of political operatives whose 
jaundiced analyses the court found distracting (Kofi, 
2013). Besides, the Supreme Court warned partisans of 
writing letters to judges. “Writing letters to a judge on a 
matter waiting in court is contemptuous and the practice 
should cease” (Writing Letters Contemptuous, 2013). 
The contempt warning, however, took an unexpected 
turn when the court called up three people to appear for 
publishing and making certain harmful statements and 
sentenced two to prison terms (Ken, 2013). The Court’s 
action stirred debate among Ghanaians about free speech 
vis-a-vis the judiciary misusing its power. One columnist 
asserted the “court operated under anachronistic 
common law of contempt that gives the judge free reign 
to intimidate, harass and humiliate the contemnor” 
(Agyenim, 2013). 
The court challenge showed a common strategy 
Ghanaians employ to ameliorate political crisis by 
allowing community leaders, traditional chiefs, and 
religious leaders to appeal to the public to do right. Such 
strategy of political mediation is by no means unique to 
Ghanaians, but anxiety over the court decision causing 
uproar made the public to search for anything that would 
work. One such strategy was to keep law enforcement 
agencies apprised of their basic responsibility to 
prevent violence. Consequently, Ghana’s top security 
chiefs including the Inspector-General of Police, the 
Commissioner of Police, the Chief of Defense Staff, the 
National Security Coordinator, the Director of Police 
Operations and the Accra Regional Police Commander 
held periodic meetings about securing the peace, several 
months before the December elections began. Besides, 
civil society comprising leaders of trade associations and 
former politicians realizing the imminency of violence, 
appealed to voters not to overreact to the court decision. 
Religious leaders mediating conflict through prayer and 
moral suasion have become an ingrained tradition in 
African politics (Haynes, 1993; Riedl, 2012). No country 
exemplifies this tradition than Ghana where people 
believe the opinion religious leaders express about 
politics may be divinely inspired, and therefore, attaches 
extra significance to those opinions (Yirenkyi, 2000; 
Kudadjie & Aboagye-Mensah, 1991). 
Ghana did not erupt into the violence most people 
feared would happen no matter which direction the 
court’s decision went. The country is accepting the 
verdict with distinguished calm proved the rule of law 
worked, although not after freezing people in a state of 
apprehension. The Supreme Court paying attention to the 
minutest detail of the law and court procedure to assure 
the litigants of its impartiality, the mediative measures 
community leaders took to prevent anarchy, and the 
public unanimously accepting the decision without 
breaking out in spontaneous uproar of disapproval, 
proved that Ghanaians had embraced the essential 
rules of democratic governance. Ghanaians may claim, 
righteously, the checks and balances and the adjudicative 
procedures the 1992 Constitution laid out worked. Most 
African countries have constitutions similarly patterned 
to uphold the rule of law but they have not always 
worked according to expectation. Ghanaians making 
such claim, however, ignores the fact the country did not 
face a crisis the gravity of which would have pushed its 
survival mettle to the brink. Such circumstance would 
have happened had the Supreme Court declared that 
the ruling party hand power over to the opposition, and 
reversed the fortunes of the two parties. This scenario of 
the Supreme Court ruling in favor of Akufo-Addo and he 
winning newly ordered elections seems far-fetched, but 
it was as close as one judge switching his or her vote. 
The ruling NDC party and its supporters, undoubtedly, 
might have taken the implacable stance the Supreme 
Court had robbed them of victory, and commanded the 
party’s supporters to start civil disobedience. Besides, 
any recall decision the Supreme Court might have made 
would have been awkward, considering John Mahama 
had already served eight months of his presidential 
term and made most of his ministerial appointments. 
On the other hand, by lodging what he and his party 
believed was a justiciable complaint allowed Akufo-
Addo and the NPP the opportunity to present evidence 
about the truth of their claim in full public view. Not 
winning the court challenge, doubtless, must have 
disappointed the plaintiffs, but perhaps not momentously 
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so. That probably explains why Akufo-Addo accepted 
the court decision instantly and stoically. He suffered 
a monumental damage to his reputation and his party’s 
but the court ruling hardly changed his political 
circumstance.
CONCLUSION
Ghana’s democracy worked according to the rules that 
country’s constitution had laid down for justiciable 
issues to be resolved. Ghana’s 1992 Constitution 
allows candidates and political parties aggrieved by an 
unfavorable electoral result to appeal to the Supreme 
Court (High Court) for a redress. The proof the 
constitution had been working was Ghana not erupting 
into mayhem after the Supreme Court presented its 
verdict. It was a close verdict and Ghana was fortunate 
to have escaped the disruption that has entrapped many 
countries practicing multiparty politics. Nevertheless, the 
court challenge has raised questions about the manner 
in which the Supreme Court went about adjudicating 
the case and whether that predestined the result. In order 
not to impede the court’s adjudicatory authority, the 
constitution does not set any time limit within which the 
court could decide electoral disputes whose relevancy 
depends on their contemporaneity. The Supreme Court 
recognizing it was under scrutiny because its ruling could 
have far-reaching consequences on Ghana’s political 
landscape, took time to deliberate─ perhaps too much 
time. The court had discretionary authority to dispense 
the case promptly, but it gravitated on the side of caution, 
perusing every evidentiary detail. In all likelihood, if 
the court had decided the case within a limited time, the 
losing party and its supporters might have conveniently 
ignored the merits of the case and concentrated rather on 
the uncritical manner in which the evidence presented was 
examined. The Supreme Court believed in conducting its 
business with unremitting attention and gave its decision 
only after ensuring it followed every detail of the law 
including petitioners, respondents, and their counsel 
observing proper courtroom protocol. Nana Akufo-Addo, 
the petitioner, accepting the court verdict stoically without 
questioning the integrity of the justices who ruled against 
him vindicated the court’s strategy.4
John Mahama who the Supreme Court had sworn in 
as President in January 2013, undoubtedly, might have 
had his morale dampened by the impending court case. 
Throughout the court’s deliberation, however, he acted as 
if the challenge was inconsequential. He was in charge as 
4 A journalist, Cameron Duodu, interviewed Akufo-Addo shortly 
after the court verdict. Akufo-Addo, he asserts, was unhappy with 
the ruling but chose to remain calm. Duodu attributes Akufo-Addo’s 
behavior to his family background, especially his late father, Edward 
Akufo-Addo, serving as Ghana’s president from the early 1970s.
Duodu, Cameron, 2014. “Why Akufo-Addo Chose Caution, Not 
Confrontation.” New African, 48(538), 68-71.
Ghana’s chief executive, and wasted little time appointing 
his cabinet ministers, touring the country and showing his 
appreciation for those who voted for him. He also took 
several foreign trips. To Mahama, the court challenge 
looked like a dismissible distraction. It is impossible to 
speculate, however, that President Mahama’s demeanor of 
unconcern was predicated on an irrational belief he would 
win the case because the court was taking too long to 
decide. Mahama and his supporters might have believed 
the highest court of the land recognized it would be the 
highest act of irresponsibility to reverse the modicum 
of tranquility the country had been enjoying and the 
decisions of the new administration had made. The court’s 
strategy and demeanor of thoroughness and impartiality 
yielded a big reward for the institution because Ghana’s 
usually critical partisan press was deferential to the 
Supreme Court, never accusing it of impropriety in spite 
of the contempt citations. The controversy between the 
NDC and NPP over who really won the elections rages 
on until today, several months since the Supreme Court 
delivered its verdict. This rancor may never stop before 
the 2016 elections. The NPP and its presidential candidate 
challenging the elections in court must be valued for 
the cathartic effect it may have on Ghana’s politics for 
the future. The court challenge dramatically highlighted 
the flaws that parliament and the EC had overlooked 
in Ghana’s elections. It is doubtful the EC would have 
recognized the deep-seated problems associated with 
casting ballots, collating them and reporting the data from 
polling stations to election headquarters and fixed them. 
For Ghana to avoid a repeat of dreaded court 
challenges of presidential elections in the future of the 
country may have to draw some lessons from this first 
experience, the most important being future elections 
becoming sanitized from fraud. Mitigating this possibility, 
however, may need the EC removing the bottlenecks 
that have hampered its ability to conduct elections 
efficiently. The EC must deliver ballots boxes to voting 
centers several days ahead of the voting day and their 
safety secured through close-circuit television. The 
EC must consider seeking assistance from the military 
to complement the police to beef up security and ease 
the logistical challenges associated with voting, by 
providing helicopters and armored cars to deliver ballot 
boxes to polling centers in far to reach places. When 
seeking ideas to improve the integrity of voting, the 
EC must allow all actors who have direct and indirect 
interest in elections to contribute, not only the party in 
power or groups affiliated with the government. These 
actors include the organizations that helped to facilitate 
the 2012 elections such as the Supreme Court, election 
monitors, non-governmental organizations and the EC. 
These organizations recommended Ghana improving 
the efficiency and sanctity of future elections. The EC 
may have to hire and train extra personnel to address 
the problems the electorate typically faces on voting 
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day. These include the discrepancies on voting rosters 
between electors ready to cast their ballots and not finding 
their names, missing biometric cards, and checking and 
counterchecking voting tallies in full public’s view before 
sending the result to the EC’s headquarters. Above all, to 
address electoral disputes speedily, Ghana’s parliament 
may have to revise the constitution to replace the Supreme 
Court as the final arbiter of electoral disputes with an 
Electoral Board or Commission.
Violence has become an unflattering quality defining 
African politics, as some rival parties have never trusted 
addressing their differences through dialogue. Ghanaians 
waited patiently for the court to take its full recourse to 
settle this thorny political dispute and dutifully abided 
by the court’s decision. This is the spirit about the rule 
of law that the 1992 hoped would guide political action. 
The plaintiffs and respondents trusting the Supreme Court 
to render an impartial verdict in such a historic case also 
were also in the spirit of the 1992 constitution espouses. 
Ghanaians trusting the court to settle a controversial 
electoral dispute fairly were probably oblivious to 
the panic and uncertainty in which the slow pace of 
adjudication would enshroud the country. Ghanaians, 
however, enormously rewarded themselves for the 
months in which they endured panic and uncertainty in 
the deaths averted. These deaths could have tallied in the 
thousands, had the parties in the dispute encouraged their 
supporters to express their discontent about the elections 
in the streets. By allowing democracy to work through 
the court painstakingly examining the evidence, however, 
every Ghanaian won, not least by the country keeping its 
reputation as an island of reason and stability in a sea of 
chaos. Many African countries can draw some lessons 
from Ghana when resolving electoral disputes to allow 
the rule of law to run its full course, not to seek impulsive 
answers through violent action. Countries that choose 
to resolve electoral disputes civilly may pay a price not 
different from what Ghana paid in fear and puzzlement. 
Countries, however, may pay a heavier price when they 
wilfully do not allow the rule of law to work. 
REFERENCES
Agresti, A., & Brett, P. (2002). Misvotes, undervotes and 
overvotes: The 2000 presidential election in Florida. 
Statistical Science, 17(4), 436-440.
Agyeman-Togobo, K. (2012, December 4 ). The power of the 
thumb. Retrieved September 2013 from http://allafrica.com/
stories/201212041665.html
Agyeman-Togobo, K. (2012, December 4). The power of the 
thumb. Retrieved September 2013from http://allafrica.com/
stories/201212041665.html
Boateng, A. (2013, July 17). Abuse of judicial power through 
contempt of court. Ghanaweb.com. Retrieved July 23, 
2013 from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/
NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=279707
Branch, D., & Cheseman, N. (2009). Democratization, 
sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. 
African Affairs, 108(430), 1-26. 
Burke, L. (2013). Ghana election, a democracy test Ghana 
election, A democracy test. December 6, 2012 Retrieved 
from http://news.yahoo.com/ghana-election-democracy-
test-154857675.html
Chazan, N. (1982). Ethnicity and politics in Ghana. Political 
Science Quarterly, 97(3), 461-485. 
Christian Council Launches Election Observation Report. (2013, 
December 12). Retrieved from http://www.ghanamma.com/
christian-council-launches-election-observation-report/
Daxecker,  U. (2012).  The cost of exposing cheating: 
International election monitoring. Journal of Peace 
Research, 49(4), 503-516.
Dercon, S., & Gutierrez-Romero, R. (2012). Triggers and 
characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan electoral violence. World 
Development, 40(4), 731-744.
Duodu, C. (2013). Ghana: The court case that Left the nation 
dazed. New African, Issue 532,70-72.
Enorch, D. F. (2013, April 17). Supreme court endorses live 
coverage. Graphic.com. Retrieved from http://graphic.com.
gh/General-News/supreme-court-endorses-live-coverage.html
Gadzekpo, A. (2001). Reflections on Ghana’s recent elections. 
Review of African Political Economy, 28(88), 267-273.
Ghana Supreme Court. (2013, August 29). Presidential elections 
petition. Writ No. J1/6/2013. 
Haynes, J. (1993). Sustainable democracy in Ghana? Problems 
and prospects. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 451-467.
Haynes, J. (1993). Sustainable democracy in Ghana? Problems 
and prospects. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 451-467.
Heinz J., Kohnert, D., & Nugent, P. (2010). The successful 
Ghana election of 2008: A convenient myth? The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 48(1), 95-115.
Jeffries, R. (1998). The Ghanaian elections of 1996: Towards the 
consolidation of democracy. African Affairs, 97(387), 189-208.
Kelley, J. G. (2012). Monitoring democracy: When international 
election observation works, and why it often fails. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University.
Ken Kuranchie, Atubiga Jailed for contempt. ( 2013 July 3). 
Retrieved 5 July 2013 from http://vibeghana.com/ 
Klopp, J., & Kamungi, P. (2008). Violence and elections: Will 
Kenya collapse? World Policy Journal, 24(4), 11-18. 
KPMG finds 10,333 pink sheets. (2013, June 24). Retrieved 26 
June 2013 from http://vibeghana.com/2013/06/24/kpmg-
finds-10333-pink-sheets/ 
Kudadjie, J. N., & Aboagye-Mensah, R. K. (1991). The 
Christian and national politics. Accra: Asempa Publishers.
Lemarchand, R. (1992). Africa’s troubled transitions. Journal of 
Democracy, 3(4), 98-109.
Lindberg, S. I., & Morrison, M. K. C. (2008). Are African voters 
really ethnic or clientelistic? Survey evidence from Ghana. 
Poli t ical  Science Quarterly,  123(1), 95-122. 
Lund, C. (2003). Bawku is still volatile: Ethno-political conflict 
and state recognition in Northern Ghana. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 41(4), 587-610.
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Ghana’s 2012 Presidential Court Challenge: Panic and the 
Lessons Learned When Democracy Worked Too Well
10
Lynch, G., & Gordon, C. (2011). Democratization in Africa: 
Challenges and prospects. Democratization, 18(2), 275-310.
MacLean, L. M. (2004). Mediating ethnic conflict at the 
grassroots: The role of local associational life in shaping 
political values in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 42(4), 589-617.
Mebane, W. R. (2004). The wrong man is president! Overvotes 
in the 2000 presidential election in Florida. Perspectives on 
Politics, 29(3), 525-535.
Meissner, K. (2010, February). Elections and conflict in Ghana. 
International Policy Analysis. Retrieved from http://library.
fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07676.pdf  
Milam, W. B., & Jennifer, G. J. (2011). Ivory coast: Another 
asterisk for Africa’s democratization. Current History, 
110(736), 177-183.
Moehler, D. C. (2009). Critical citizens and submissive subjects: 
Election losers and winners in Africa. British Journal of 
Political Science, 39 (2), 342-366.
Morrison, M. K. C., & Honhg, J. W. (2006). Ghana’s political 
parties: How ethno/regional variations sustain the national 
two-party system. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
44(4), 623-647.
NPP files 400,000 documents as affidavits at supreme court. 
(2013, April 8). Retrieved 8 July 2013 from http://
vibeghana.com/2013/04/08/npp-files-400000-documents-as-
affidavits-at-supreme-court/
Nugent, P. (2001). Ethnicity as an explanatory factor in the 
Ghana 2000 elections. Ethnicity and Recent Democratic 
Experiments in Africa (2001), 29(1/2), 2-7.
Onwuekwe, C. (2006). Rule of Law and political governance: 
Africa in the 21st century, law and society. Annual meeting.
Opalo, K. O. (2012). African elections: Two divergent trends. 
African Affairs, 23(3), 80-93.
Owusu, M. (1986). Custom and coups: A juridical interpretation 
of civil order and disorder in Ghana. The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 24(1), 69-99.
Riedl, B. R. (2012). Transforming politics, dynamic religion: 
Religion’s political impact in contemporary Africa. African 
Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, 2(2), 29-50. 
Saha, J. C. (2011). Legislative democracy, economic growth, and 
multi-dimensional poverty in Sub-Sahara Africa. Journal of 
International Development, 23(3), 443-460. 
Sandbrook, R. (1996). Transitions without consolidation: 
Democratization in six African cases. Third World Quarterly, 
17(1), 69-87.
Smith, D. A. (2002). Consolidating democracy? The structural 
underpinnings of Ghana’s 2000 elections. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 40(4), 621-650.
Staffan, L. (2006). Democracy and elections in Africa. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
Straus, S. (2012). Wars do end: Changing patterns of political 
violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. African Affairs, 111(443), 
179-201.
van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidentialism and clientelism in 
Africa’s emerging party systems. The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 41(2), 297-321. 
Waki Commission Simplified Report. (Commission of Inquiry 
to Investigate the Post-Election Violence) (CIPEV), (2009, 
June 24). Retrieved from http://www.ncck.org/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114:wakireport
&catid=55: publications&Itemid=108
Wimmer, A., Lars-Erik, C., & Brian, M. (2009). Ethnic politics 
and armed conflict: A configurational analysis of a new global 
data set. American Sociological Review, 74(2), 316-337.
Writing Letters to Judges Contemptuous – Supreme Court. 
(2013, July 11). Ghana Business News. Retrieved 13 July 
2013  from http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/07/11/
wri t ing-let ters- to- judges-contemptuous-supreme-
court/#sthash.4XmzG6gp.dpuf
Yirenkyi, K. (2000). The role of christian churches in national 
politics: Reflections from laity and clergy in Ghana. 
Sociology of Religion, 61(3), 325-338;
Anonymous. (2013, August 20). Zimbabwe: Rejecting fraud 
claims, court upholds presidential election. New York, NY: 
Associated Press. 
